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Abstract. Traditional Byzantine consensus does not work in P2P net-
work due to Sybil attack while the most prevalent Sybil-proof consensus
at present still can’t resist adversary with dominant compute power. This
paper proposed opinion dynamics based consensus for P2P network with
trust relationships, consisting of the sky framework and the sky model.
With the sky framework, opinion dynamics can be applied in P2P net-
work for consensus which is Sybil-proof through trust relationships and
emerges from local interactions of each node with its direct contacts with-
out topology, global information or even sample of the network involved.
The sky model has better performance of convergence than existing mod-
els including MR, voter and Sznajd, and its lower bound of fault tolerance
performance is also analyzed and proved. Simulations show that our ap-
proach can tolerate failures by at least 13% random nodes or 2% top
influential nodes while over 96% correct nodes still make correct decision
within 70 seconds on the SNAP Wikipedia who-votes-on-whom network
for initial configuration of convergence>0.5 with reasonable latencies.
Comparing to compute power based consensus, our approach can resist
any faulty or malicious nodes by unfollowing them. To the best of our
knowledge, it’s the first work to bring opinion dynamics to P2P network
for consensus.
Keywords: opinion dynamics, P2P, Byzantine consensus, Sybil attack
1 Introduction
Emerging cryptocurrencies(e.g., Bitcoin) demonstrate the demand of consensus
over P2P network [1]. However, to keep decentralization, no logically central
and trusted authority vouches for a one-to-one correspondence between entity
and identity, thus makes it difficult to resist Sybil attack, wherein a adversary
creates a large number of pseudonymous identities to gain a disproportionately
large influence [2]. Traditional Byzantine consensus algorithms that tolerate only
a fixed fraction faulty nodes are not useful in P2P network with the presence of
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Sybil attack [3]. Existing consensus based on compute power can be Sybil-proof
but can’t resist adversary with dominant compute power [4].
Opinion dynamics is a field where mathematical-and-physical models and
computational tools are utilized to explore the dynamical processes of the dif-
fusion and evolution of opinions in human population. Based on observations of
existing studies that opinion might converge when nodes only take local inter-
actions [5], we proposed the sky framework to apply opinion dynamics in P2P
network for consensus, as well as the sky model to maximize performance. In
the sky framework, each node is identified by its public key, other nodes follow
the node if they trust it, during the process of consensus, each node broadcasts
opinion to its followers, which then decide new opinions according to their own
followees conforming the rules of the sky model. The sky model has better per-
formance of convergence than existing models including MR, voter and Sznajd,
and its lower bound of fault tolerance performance is also analyzed and proved.
Comparing to compute power based approach, ours enables disarming faulty or
potentially malicious nodes by unfollowing them. Theoretic analysis and simu-
lations both show that it can tolerate failures by at least 13% random nodes
while over 96% correct nodes still make correct decision for initial configuration
with convergence ≥ 50%. Simulations also show that on the SNAP dataset of
the Wikipedia who-votes-on-whom network [6] with reasonable latencies, it can
reach almost-everywhere consensus within 70 seconds and tolerate failures com-
mitted by 2% top influential nodes. To the best of our knowledge, it’s the first
work to bring opinion dynamics to P2P network for consensus.
2 Related Work
Sybil Attack Resistance One approach to resisting Sybil attack is relying
on a certifying authority to perform admission control, which will break decen-
tralization [7]. Another approach is remotely issuing anonymous certification of
identity by identifying distinct property of a node, e.g, utilizing geometric tech-
niques to establish location information, but it’s unreliable in a network with
changing environment [8]. Puzzle computing is also introduced to increase the
cost of Sybil attack, such puzzles involve posing a challenge that requires a large
amount of computation to solve but is easy to verify [9], however, there’s no
way to resist Sybil attack if the adversary has dominant computing resources.
Sybil prevention techniques based on the connectivity characteristics of social
graphs is another direction, because of the difficulty to engineer social connec-
tions between attack nodes and honest nodes, this approach is considered to be
more robust over other ones [10]. Those approaches don’t target at the consensus
problem directly but provide good bases.
Cryptocurrency Bitcoin provides Sybil-proof consensus mechanism through
an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work(PoW) [1], which is actually a puz-
zle computing based approach. However, one has dominant compute power can
control the network while the rest of the network has no means to resist it, and
the proliferation of ASIC miner and mining pools already leads to the monopoly
of compute power [4, 11]. Ripple [12] also use a relationship based solution to
resist Sybil attack similar to ours, however, their algorithm has a major defect
that it relies on the assumption that for a node, if 80% of its followees agree on
a opinion, then 80% of all nodes agrees on the same opinion, but the assump-
tion only stands when a node follows an overwhelming majority of all nodes. As
reported, Ripple and other existing solutions like PoS have problem even bigger
than PoW [13, 14].
3 The Problem and Evaluation Datasets
In traditional definition of consensus, specifically binary consensus, each node
has a initial value vi ∈ {0, 1}, the consensus problem is to decide upon a common
value among all nodes. A node is correct if it behaves honestly and without error.
Conversely, a node is faulty. In a P2P network under an eclipse attack [15],
an adversary can always isolate some number of correct nodes hence almost-
everywhere consensus is the best one can hope for in such networks [16]. Similar
to existing definition [17], almost-everywhere consensus is defined that up to
εn correct nodes in a P2P network agreed on the wrong value, where n is the
network size, and ε > 0 is sufficiently small, the wrong value is 1 if initially 0 is
the majority among all correct nodes, and vise versa. We use the term opinion
instead of value in later sections following the convention of opinion dynamics.
We evaluate our approach on the SNAP dataset of Wikipedia who-votes-on-
whom [6] called as the wiki dataset in later sections, because it presents trust
relationships in the form of votes for administration. We also impose a constraint
which can be enforced in P2P client of each correct node that indegree >= 10,
thus all nodes with followees less than 10 are removed. Parameters of the result
network is shown in Table 1, and the cumulative distributions of indegrees and
outdegrees are shown in Fig. 1.
Table 1. Datasets parameters
Name Wiki
Nodes Counts 998
Average Degree 33.33
Diameter 5
Average Path Length 2.34
Density 0.033
Average Clustering Coefficient 0.183
Eigenvector Centrality Sum Change 0.029
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Fig. 1. Degree distribution of the wiki
dataset
To facilitate comparing the impact of network size, we also run simulations
upon three uniform networks with size of 100, 1000, 5000 nodes, where each
node has the same degree and connect to each other randomly. Those dataset
are named as uniform-less, uniform and uniform-more respectively.
4 The Sky Opinion Dynamics Framework
We proposed an opinion dynamics framework called the sky framework for con-
sensus over P2P network as described in this section.
4.1 Network Constructing
In our framework, each node in the P2P network is owned by somebody and
identified by a public key. When the owner of node A trusts the owner of node
B, owner of A can set A to follow B in the P2P client, and B is called as followee
while A is called as follower. The network can be abstracted to a directed graph
where each peer is a node, and each trust relationship is a directed edge. To
ensure connectivity and safety, each correct node is constrained by the P2P
client to have at least a minimum number of followees.
4.2 Consensus Process
Nodes in our framework are equally privileged and equipotent participants in
the consensus process in any time as ordinary opinion dynamics. However, we
introduced the concept of round into the consensus process which is commonly
used in existing Byzantine consensus but not in opinion dynamics. Starting from
a initial state as the first round, each correct node determines when to finish its
current round and decides its new value following a common rule according
to its current value and the values of its followees, and then enters the next
round. The common rule used here shapes the opinion dynamics model which
will be introduced in section 5. Note here to avoid centralization no global clock
or coordinator is used, each node decides how and when to enter next round
separately, thus each node may enter the same round in different time.
A node makes its final decision when enough rounds(e.g., 40) passed. A node
is deciding before making final decision. If a node finally agrees at 0 or 1, then
it’s decided. A node is confused if it’s considered to be safe at neither 0 nor 1.
For each node, by denoting the count of 0 and 1 in its current value and the
values of its followees respectively, the final decision follows the following rules:
1. If n0 > (n0+n1)∗T then agree at 0 and the criteria to agree 1 is similar. The
T constant controls the strategy to be aggressive or conservative. Greater
T results that less nodes to agree at wrong opinion but more nodes to be
confused. We use T = 2/3 in experiments.
2. If can’t agree at 0 or 1, then it’s confused.
4.3 Message Passing
A followee unidirectional broadcasts signed messages to all its followers. We al-
low a faulty node’s signature to be forged by an adversary, thereby permitting
collusion among the faulty nodes. Broadcast is implemented by DHT and asym-
metric cryptography. For a node as followee, all its followers and itself form
a sharing group(known as a “swarm”) identified by the followee’s public key.
Each broadcasted message is signed with the private key of the followee, and the
follwers can check the identity and integrity against the followee’s public key.
Each message broadcasted by nodei is a tuple of (nodeid, round, opinion,
state), where nodeid is the id of nodei, round and opinion is its current round
and opinion, and state ∈ {deciding, decided, confused} .
4.4 Message Handling
According to the well known FLP impossibility [18], consensus cannot be solved
deterministically with even a single crash failure in an asynchronous system,
because of the inherent difficulty of determining whether a process has actually
crashed or is only “very slow” [19]. We use a message filter and a failure detector
which can make mistakes by erroneously adding nodes to its list of suspects [19].
For a node, the message filter will refuse to accept any new messages if it
has already made its final decision, and it will always keep at most one message
from a followee with the largest round denoted as roundmax while roundmax ≥
node.round. The filter is applied when a node receiving a new message as well
as when a node finish a round after broadcasting opinion to its followees.
The key idea of the failure detector is that each node maintains a fol-
lowee nodes list as well as a suspect nodes list. A message is a valid mes-
sage for a node marked as node if msg.round ≥ node.round or msg.state ∈
{decided, confused}. For each node, initially all followees are in the followee
nodes list, in each round, a followee is moved to the suspect nodes list for
the followee nodes list if no valid message from it in message buffer for a long
time(failure detector time out), while a node is moved from the suspect nodes
list to the followee nodes list when a new valid message from it is received.
With the help of message filter and failure detector, a node can apply the
common rule which shapes the opinion dynamics model in the following way:
1. If a node received a message passed through the message filter, then it should
check whether to apply the common rule or not.
2. On failure detector timeout event for each round, it should check whether
to apply the common rule or not.
3. A node apply the common rule only when its message buffer has messages
from all nodes in its followee nodes list.
5 The Sky Opinion Dynamics Model
At time t, a node receives all the messages broadcasted by its followees at t−dt,
then finishes processing the received messages and broadcast its new opinion at
t. By designating the opinion of nodei at time t to be vi(t), the model can be
expressed as a function F :
vi(t+ dt) = F(vi(t), Vi(t)) (1)
where Vi(t) = [vf1 (t), vf2(t), . . . vfn(t)] and f1, f2, . . . jn are followees of nodei.
In later sections we designate the count of 0 and 1 in {Vi(t), vi(t)} to be n0i(t),
n1i(t) respectively.
However, due to the difficulty to directly analyze the stochastic process of the
interactions between every nodes described in Eq. (1), we analyze our opinion dy-
namics model using mean field theory(MFT) [20] which is widely used in opinion
dynamics as an effective modeling method [5]. By MFT, the opinion dynamics
model shaped by the common rule can be expressed by a continuous differential
equation, and the round can be regarded as dt = 1 in the corresponding equation
shown in Eq. (2).
We denote the densities of correct nodes to be c = c0 + c1 where c0 and
c1 are the densities of correct nodes with opinion of 0 and 1, and densities of
faulty nodes to be f = f0 + f1 + fs where f0 and f1 are the density of faulty
nodes with opinion of 0 and 1 and fs are the density of faulty nodes without
opinions broadcasted. So we have c + f = 1. We also denote densities of all
nodes(including correct and faulty nodes) with opinion 0 and 1 to be a0 and a1
respectively, thus we have a0 = (c0 + f0)/(1− fs) and a1 = (c1 + f1)/(1− fs).
By designating the derivative of c0 on t to be dc0/dt which is actually the
change speed of c0, we can have Eq. (2) where s1 is the probability that a node
flips from opinion 1 to opinion 0, and s0 is the contrary.
dc0
dt
= −
dc1
dt
= c1s1 − c0s0 (2)
We adapt the paradigmatic majority rule(MR) model, and then proposed
the sky model by incorporating the MR model with a simulated annealing(SA)
model we proposed.
5.1 Majority Rule Model
Traditional majority rule(MR) model needs to select a group each time and then
make all of the nodes in the group conform the majority opinion of the group,
however, there’s no such group in the sky framework. We adapt the MR model
by regarding each node and all of its followees as a group, but instead of making
all of the nodes inside the group to have the majority opinion, we just let the
node itself to have that opinion without its followees changed. The rule is shown
as following:
1. If n0i(t) > n1i(t), then set new opinion to 0, and vise versa.
2. If n0i(t) = n1i(t), then select from {0, 1} randomly.
We specify the mean indegree and outdegree of a node to be D. According
to the first rule, a node flips from opinion 1 to opinion 0 only when the count
of its followees with opinion of 1 is less than D/2, and vice versa, and according
to the second rule, when the count of its followees with opinion of 1 equals to
D/2, it has probability of 1/2 to flip, thus for Eq. (2), we can have the following
equation: 

s1 = F (
D
2
− 1;D, a1) +
1
2
d(
D
2
;D, a1)
s0 = F (
D
2
− 1;D, a0) +
1
2
d(
D
2
;D, a0)
(3)
where F (k;n, p) is the cumulative distribution function and d(k;n, p) is the prob-
ability mass function for k successes in binomial distribution of n trials with
probability p.
5.2 Simulated Annealing Model
The simulated annealing(SA) model we proposed provides nodes the ability
to escape from their current opinion at some probability while keep stable if
n1i(t)/n0i(t) or n0i(t)/n1i(t) is big enough for a node, as shown in the follow-
ing:
1. If n0i(t) > 4 ∗ n1i(t) then set new opinion to 0, while if n1i(t) > 4 ∗ n0i(t)
then set new opinion to 1.
2. Otherwise set new opinion to 0 with probability of n0i(t)/(n0i(t) + n1i(t))
and set new opinion to 1 with probability of n1i(t)/(n0i(t) + n1i(t)).
With the notations same as the previous section, for Eq. (2), we can have
the following equation:

s1 = F (0.2D;D, a1) +
0.8D∑
i=0.2D
d(i;D, a1)(
D − i
D
+
1
2D
)
s0 = F (0.2D;D, a0) +
0.8D∑
i=0.2D
d(i;D, a0)(
D − i
D
+
1
2D
)
(4)
5.3 Sky Model
For each node, the sky model randomly selects a rule from the rules correspond-
ing to the MR model and the SA model, thus dc0/dt is a linear combination of
that of the MR and the SA model as the the following equation, where dgc0/dt
is Eq. (2) with Eq. (3) and dsc0/dt is Eq. (2) with Eq. (4):
dc0
dt
=
dgc0
dt
∗ ratio+
dsc0
dt
∗ (1− ratio) =
1
2
(
dgc0
dt
+
dsc0
dt
) (5)
6 Convergence of the Sky Model
Under the assumption that all nodes are correct, we can have a0 = c0 and a1 =
c1. Because the model is symmetric on binary opinion 0 and 1, and c0 + c1 = 1,
it’s sufficient to only track c0 and consider c0 ≥ 0.5. According to the
mean field equations, dc0/dt(a.k.a. the change speed of c0) and
∫
dc0
dt
dt (a.k.a
c0) are demonstrated in Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b respectively. From Fig. 2a we can see
that ∀c0 ∈ (0.5, 1) and ∀D > 0, change speed of c0 is always positive, i.e.,sky c0
strictly increases with time t. This conclusion can also be proved mathematically,
but it won’t be presented here due to lack of space in this paper. From Fig. 2b
we can see that network with greater degree D will converge more quickly. We
can also see that with a tiny deviation of c0 from 0.5, even when D = 5, c0 can
still converge to 1 in about 10 rounds.
We simulate the sky model on the wiki dataset for 1000 runs starting with
c0 = c1 = 0.5 , where convergence is defined as cvg = |c0 − c1|/(c0 + c1), note
here the network may also agree at 1 instead of 0. Some of other existing opinion
dynamic models besides the MR model can also be adapted to our framework,
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Fig. 2. Numeric analysis of the sky model
the voter model can be adapted by that for each node the opinion of a random
selected node from all of its followees is chosen, and the Sznajd model can be
adapted by that for each node if two randomly chosen followees have the same
opinion, then the node set its opinion to that opinion otherwise nothing happens.
The convergence and rounds to converge for all the models on the wiki dataset
are show in Fig. 3 . Note round 41 means the network failed to reach
consensus within 40 rounds in that run, and also each bin of the histogram
is 2.
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Fig. 3. Simulation of all the models on the wiki dataset
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
round
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
co
n
v
e
rg
e
n
ce theory
uniform-less
uniform
uniform-more
wiki
(a) Convergence
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
round
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
Histogram of rounds to reach consensus: bin=2
uniform-less
uniform
uniform-more
wiki
(b) Rounds to reach consensus
Fig. 4. Simulation of the sky model on different datasets
From Fig. 3b , we can see that for the sky model, probability of rounds needed
to reach consensus decrease asymptotically when greater than 10, and all of the
runs can reach consensus within 40 rounds. In contract, all of the other models
have some runs can’t reach consensus within 40 rounds. Some of runs of the MR
model can never reach consensus, and simulation shows the network may stuck
in a stable state where both the nodes with opinion of 0 and 1 exist, but they
never change in later rounds. Majority of the runs of the SA model will not reach
consensus in 40 rounds, simulations shows that the network may vastly change
in each round without steady change direction of convergence, and escape in a
tiny probability from the state to the track with convergence steadily increased
in each round.
The sky model on all the datasets are show in Fig. 4 . From Fig. 4a , we can
see that for the sky model on each dataset, simulation result of the sky model
approximately fits theoretical analysis. Rounds to converge grows with nodes
count(denoted as N), and approaches more closely to theoretical result when N
is larger, that’s because mean field equation works best when N →∞, thus ∀N
the theoretical result is in fact the theoretical lower bound. From Fig. 4b , we
can see that for the sky model, all the runs on all datasets can reach consensus
within 40 rounds. Most of the runs can reach consensus quickly in about 10
rounds.
7 Fault Tolerance of the Sky Model
7.1 Sybil Attack
Sybil attack resistance analysis is straightforward. See Fig. 5, where node marked
by A is the current node deciding its new opinion, and A decide its opinions
according to opinions broadcasted by its followees including correct nodes C
and faulty nodes F while nodes S are Sybil nodes. Because of the difficulty for S
to make A trust S which is actually controlled by A rather than S, there are
no directed links from S to A, so Sybil nodes take no effect when A is deciding
its new opinion. Collusion among F and S does not help the attack, because the
contribution to the decision of A is still the same with F without S.
A F
C
C
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Fig. 5. Sybil attack
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To compromise the network, creating new Sybil nodes or relationships be-
tween them are useless, instead, the adversary should attract more correct nodes
to follow the nodes controlled by him. Experiments presented in later sections
even show that for the same number of trust relationships from correct nodes to
faulty nodes, the smaller the faulty nodes number is, the stronger the attack is.
7.2 Lower Bound
Because the model is symmetric on binary opinion 0 and 1, it’s sufficient to
only track the case that c0 ≥ c1.
According to our definition of almost-everywhere consensus, a successful con-
sensus process should fulfill the following requirements:
1. If c0 is far greater than c1(e.g., c0 ≥ 2c1), then at least (1− ǫ) proportion of
correct nodes should agree at 0.
2. Else at least (1 − ǫ) proportion of correct nodes should agree at the same
opinion which is either 0 or 1.
Under Byzantine failures, a faulty node can behave arbitrarily or even collude
with other nodes. Different behavior of faulty nodes contributes differently to
the evolution of c0 in the mean field equations. Here are some scenarios:
1. All faulty nodes left the network at t− dt, then at t we have a0 = c0/(1− f)
and a1 = c1/(1− f).
2. This scenario is not about failure, but about the dynamic characteristic of
P2P network. Same number of correct nodes with opinion 0 joins the network
at t−dt, then at then at t we have new c0 denoted as c
′
0 with c
′
0 = 2c0/(1+c0)
together with the corresponding c′1 = c1/(1 + c0), a
′
0 = 2c0/(1 + c0) and
a′1 = c1/(1 + c0).
3. All faulty nodes always broadcast 1 at t− dt, then at t we have a0 = c0 and
a1 = c1 + f .
4. All faulty nodes broadcast 1 to half of their followees and 0 to the other half
at t− dt, then at t we have a0 = c0 + f/2 and a1 = c1 + f/2
5. Faulty nodes broadcast opinion randomly chosen from 0 and 1 at t−dt, then
at t we also have a0 = c0 + f/2 and a1 = c1 + f/2
6. Faulty nodes broadcast 1 when they should broadcast 0 and vise versa at
t− dt, then at t we have a0 = c0 + f
′
0 and a1 = c1+ f
′
1, where f
′
0 and f
′
1 can
be calculated according to the mean field equations similar to Eq. (2).
Note that the first two examples show how the agreement evolves in dy-
namic network, also topology or global view of the network are not involved in
our model, and consensus emerges from local interactions of each node with its
direct contacts. Failures can’t be enumerated exhaustively and they can mix in
a network, but since max( c0+f0
1−fs
) = max( c0+f0
c0+c1+f0+f1
) = c0+ f when f0 = f and
f1 = fs = 0, and min
c0+f0
1−fs
= c0 when f0 = fs = 0 and f1 = f , the following
constraint always stands: {
a0 ∈ [c0, c0 + f ]
a0 + a1 = 1
(6)
Lemma 1 (If the network can tolerate any failures committed by given
faulty nodes, it must agree at 0).
For a network with c0, c1 and f given at time t to be c0(t), c1(t) and f(t), if
it can tolerate any failures committed by faulty nodes, then it must agree at 0.
Proof. For the case that c0(t) that is far greater than c1(t), it stands according
to the almost-everywhere consensus requirements stated above. For the else case,
if some failures can stop it to agree at 0, then according to the requirements it
must agree at 1, s.t. ∃ time t′ > t and c0(t
′) ≤ ε(1−f). Because of the continuity
of c0 on t, must ∃t
′′, s.t t′ > t′′ > t, c′′0 ∈ [c0(t
′), c0(t)], c0(t
′′) = c1(t) < c0(t) and
c1(t
′′) = 1− f − c0(t
′′) = c0(t
′′). But according to the symmetric property of the
model, the failures must also be able to stop it to agree at 1 from time t′′, thus
leads to contradiction.
Lemma 2 (For given f , greater c0 tolerate failures equally or better).
For a network with given f , if at two times t′ and t′′(no relationship between
t′ and t′′ assumed), s.t c0(t
′) < c0(t
′′), and for t > t′, network can tolerate any
failures, then it can also tolerate any failures for t > t′′.
Proof. If for t > t′ and the network can tolerate any failures, then according to
Lemma 1, it must agree at 0. We then discuss in two cases. For c0(t
′′) ≤ ε(1−f),
because of the continuity of c0 on t, ∃t
′′′ s.t. c0(t
′′′) = c0(t
′′) ∈ [c0(t
′), ε(1 − f)]
and c1(t
′′′) = 1− f− c0(t
′′′) = c1(t
′′) , thus the network can tolerate any failures
for t > t′′′, we can then conclude the network can also tolerate any failures for
t > t′′. For c0(t
′′) > ε(1− f), if it can’t reach consensus successfully, then must
∃t′′′ > t′′ s.t c0(t
′′′) ∈ [c0(t
′), ε(1− f)], but it’s already known that for t > t′ s.t
c0(t) ∈ [c0(t
′), ε(1− f)] it can tolerate any failures, thus leads to contradiction.
Lemma 3 (If tolerate smaller a0, then tolerate greater a0).
For a network with given f , c0 and c1, if at two times t
′ and t′′(no relationship
between t′ and t′′ assumed), s.t a0(t
′) < a0(t
′′), and for t > t′, network can
tolerate any failures, then it can also tolerate any failures for t > t′′.
Proof. From Eq. (5) we can see that given other parameters, dc0/dt strictly
increases with a0(note that a1 = 1−a0), then c0(t
′+dt) < c0(t
′′+dt). According
to Lemma 2, it can also tolerate any failures for t > t′′.
Theorem 1 (Lower bound of fault tolerance).
For any network with known faulty nodes and initial states of correct nodes,
thus c0, c1 and f are given, if the network can tolerate the failure that all the
faulty nodes always output 1, it can tolerate any other failures.
Proof. According to Lemma 3, and Eq. (6), if a network can tolerate failure with
a0 = c0 together with a1 = c1 + f , then it can tolerate any other failures. And
a0 = c0 together with a1 = c1 + f is exactly the case all the faulty nodes always
output 1, thus the theorem stands.
7.3 Fault Tolerance Performance
Because of the constraint that c0+ c1+ f = 1, it’s not convenience to study the
performance threshold of fault tolerance on C0 directly. However, we can trans-
lated the threshold question to a new one: if at time t a network with c0 = p has
no faulty nodes, then uniformly choose f proportion of all the nodes(including
opinion with 0 and 1) to be faulty, what’s the max value of f the network can
tolerate?
fcritical is the critical point for p if fcritical fulfill the following two require-
ments:
1. ∀f < fcritical, when t→∞ and under any failures, c0/(1− f) ≥ 1− ε.
2. ∄f ′ such that f ′ fulfill the previous requirement while f ′ > fcritical.
Following the definition of critical point, according to Theorem1 for ε = 0.05,
by iterating on the mean field equation, critical points can be plotted in Fig. 6,
where solid lines are critical points. There are also dotted lines where at each
point dc0/dt = 0. From the figure we can see that ∀D ∈ [10, 400], as long as
p ≥ 0.75, the network can tolerate any failure with f ≤ 0.13.
8 Experiment
According to existing studies, latency between peers in DHT is mostly between
50 to 1000 ms [21]. In our experiment, we employ a simply latency model that the
time for each message to be delivered conforms gauss distribution of (µ = 500,
σ = 500) with lower cutoff of 50 and no upper cutoff which means a message
may never be lost in a small probability even if the node broadcasts it is correct,
we also set timeout = 2000 for the failure detector.
Since for a network with c0 far greater than c1(e.g., c0 ≥ 2c1), reaching
consensus at 0 is successful, but that at 1 is failed, we define signed convergence
as the Eq. (7), thus only if a network survive from failures, signed convergence
will equal to convergence defined earlier.
cvg = (c0 − c1)/(c0 + c1) (7)
To measure final decision of correct nodes, we also define decision as the
following equation:
decision = |d0 − d1|/(d0 + d1) (8)
where d0 and d1 is the count of correct nodes which have final decision on opinion
0 and 1 respectively.
We experiment on network started with cvg = 0.5 and f = 13% while faulty
nodes always output 1, then in all decided correct nodes(agree at 0 or 1), for
all dataset correct deciding(agree at 0) is about 96%, and uniform datasets have
almost the same performance regardless their network scale, as shown in Fig. 7a.
But for the wiki datasets, we also concern the tolerance of failures by collusion
of top n% influential nodes, defined as the first n% nodes by sorting all nodes
in descendant order on the count of a node’s followees. Simulation shows that
for the target ε < 5%, the algorithm can tolerate failures by 2% top nodes on
the wiki dataset, as shown in Fig. 7b, where the red dotted lines are the case of
failed to reach the goal under failures commited by 3% top nodes. In all decided
correct nodes(agree at 0 or 1), correct deciding(agree at 0) is about 96.8%.
Comparing failures committed by random nodes and top influential nodes, we
also find that more centralized trust relationships leads to more power-
ful ability to compromise the network even when the total numbers of trust
relationships participated in the collusion are the same, and in theory analysis
we have already known that the effect of a specific failure depends on the density
of trust relationships for correct nodes to faulty nodes. For the wiki dataset, the
total trust relationships is 33256, and for 13% random nodes, the trust rela-
tionships involved is about 4323, while for top 3% nodes, the trust relationships
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Fig. 7. Convergence under failures
involved is only 2155, in contrast that the network can survive in the former
but no in the later. Even excluding the factor that lots of trust relationships are
among the faulty nodes which has no effect for correct nodes in the 13% random
node case, the result also supports the finding.
9 Future Work and Conclusion
Although our approach can successfully runs over the wiki dataset, it also shows
the consensus speed degrades comparing to the uniform dataset, as existing
studies show that community strength impacts the performance [22]. The rela-
tionships between our model and community strength need to be studied further.
Fault tolerance performance will degenerate when starting with convergence ≤
0.5 as we can see from Fig. 6. However, layered on this work, hash value consen-
sus has been developed by us which can tolerate failures well in any case utilizing
the premise that hash collision is impossible when hash size is big enough.
Sybil-proof consensus is still an open problem, and even the most prevalent
Sybil-proof consensus at present still have a big problem that it can’t resist
adversary with dominant compute power. Opinion dynamics based approach
presented in this paper is a new attempt to circumvent the problems of existing
solutions. Theoretical and experimental result reveals that it has acceptable
performance and the ability to resist any faulty or malicious nodes by unfollowing
them. To the best of our knowledge, it’s the first work to bring opinion dynamics
to P2P network for consensus.
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